

Do the people govern?

GGA's aim is to provide credible and fact-based information about the state of Africa. In the run-up to the South African local elections and concerned with the quality of government in the country, we commissioned research company Markdata to include a number of questions on our behalf as part of their 2015 national survey. We were left feeling so unsettled by the findings that we had KPMG check the numbers in our report against those in the survey we commissioned from Markdata. They all tally up.

The results are revealing, to say the least. They confirm an urgent need for South Africa's government to significantly improve the quality of its administration, as well as economic and social development and service delivery to communities at the local level.

Popular dissatisfaction with local government is growing, with social grants and pensions practically the only successes. Citizens at grassroots level consistently express strongly negative sentiments regarding the absence of accountability, as well as about pervasive incompetence and corruption in our local governments. They identify the ruling party's failure to take responsibility for the economy and unemployment as another source of dissatisfaction. South African citizens are also disillusioned with regard to law and order, education and health services, and sceptical regarding their democratic freedoms.

In short, the majority of people interviewed have lost hope in the capacity of the government to hear and respond to them. Yet we live in a land whose aspiration is for the people to govern. It would appear that we still have a long walk to achieve true democratic freedom.

Our in-house study has provided us with rich data for analysis, on the basis of which we have devised the GGA Governance Performance Index (GPI), comprised of league tables at both provincial and national level that have enabled us to rank levels of municipal performance in South Africa. Our rankings are based on 15 indicators, encompassing administrative, economic development and service delivery related variables. The results are startling in some respects, yet not unexpected in others.

Out of the top 20 municipalities, 15 are located in the Western Cape, with three in the Northern Cape and two in the Free State. Some 60% of the bottom 20 are in the Eastern Cape, 30% in KwaZulu-Natal and one each in Limpopo and the North West provinces respectively. A coalition headed by the Democratic Alliance (DA) runs the top municipality of Swellendam. The African National Congress (ANC) is in power in 40% of the top 20 municipalities. The DA is the sole administrator of 45% of the top 20, while it is in coalitions with other parties in 20% of the others.

On the flipside, the ruling ANC controls the bottom 20 municipalities, with Mbizana in the Eastern Cape at the bottom of the rankings. However, the ANC controls some 200 of the 234 municipalities surveyed and its performance is scattered between top-end and bottom-end rankings at a provincial level.

The GGA report isolates some of the factors at play in determining the positioning of the various municipalities and makes certain key recommendations to enhance governance. Finally, we have shared Markdata's analysis on local ward councillors. In the main, it demonstrates that the vast majority of people neither know their ward councillor, nor how to access them, and that they have not experienced any gains from the work of their councillors in the last year. The overall ranking of councillors is poor, averaging less than 4/10 across the sample. The general feeling is summed up by one indicative comment that "we will see them when it is election time."

This leaves us with a conundrum: if governance in a democratic sense is, as we would like to believe, "of the people, by the people, for the people", then how can we reconcile this with a situation in which the people largely do not feel represented, are frustrated, dissatisfied and in some instances radically disillusioned—independent of age, colour, gender, language, province or socio-economic group?

How can we speak of people governing when they don't even know—or know how to access—their local councillors at the grassroots level?

Tragically, it is the poorest people, that is those in the lowest Living Standards Measure, who show the least satisfaction with the local governors, while simultaneously demonstrating a profound dependency on social grants and pensions to stay alive. Surely this is not, and could never be, the desired state of affairs for any government concerned with the well-being of its people?

At Good Governance Africa we strive precisely to promote what our

name suggests; we celebrate examples of good governance and expose the bad, in our endeavour to facilitate positive transformation. To this end, Lukhona Mnguni opens our dialogue on South Africa with insightful analysis that not only diagnoses the ills plaguing the nation's local governance, but which also provides some helpful proposals on taking remedial and restorative action. It is critical engagement such as this that we are delighted to encourage.

We hope that our information and analysis will be useful in making a meaningful contribution to well-founded, evidence-based critique and decision-making that will enable local government entities, proactive citizens and civil society groups to work to the general good. As the people of South Africa, therefore, let us remain bold and brave in asserting our very own democratic mantra, *Amandla awethu*, the power is ours!

Alain Tschudin
Executive Director

SA: local government

Why the country's municipalities are failing and how to fix them

Grassroots grievances

Lukhona Mnguni

Local government is a constitutional imperative in South Africa. Section 152 (1) of the country's constitution requires municipalities to be responsive, accountable and inclusive. A 2009 document by the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA) defines local government as “a key part of the reconstruction and development effort in our country”. Yet, 21 years into the democratic dispensation, local government is failing.

One measure of this is growing civic dissatisfaction with the quality of local government. According to the Civic Protests Barometer 2007-2014, published by the Multi-Level Government Initiative (MLGI), the number of “civic protests” in South Africa reached an all-time high in 2014, at 218. Since 2008 there have been over 100 protest incidents every year.

The level of violence associated with these protests is also rising. “In 2007 just less than half the protests were associated with some violence. In 2014 almost 80% of protests involved

violence on the part of participants or the authorities,” according to the study. Moreover, “issues relating to municipal services and the administration of municipalities were cited more often as cause of protests than all other grievances put together.”

Interestingly, the report concludes that the rise in civic protests does not reflect a “rebellion of the poor”, as suggested in “public debates, political statements and even academic publications”. There was only a 19% correlation between the number of protests and the number of poor people, defined as “those living in the poorest 25 percent of households, counting only those aged 16 to 59”, in the municipalities where protests took place for the period under review, it says. “We need to look for other explanations for the extensive involvement of the non-poor in protests,” it concludes. Yet the report itself shows that the rise in protests is strongly associated with dissatisfaction with municipal services.

According to the University of Cape Town's Professor Tom Koelble, the main reason why local government is failing is due to a lack of capacity, which “translates to...failures in local governance”. In particular, he identifies a lack of capacity among local government technical staff and managers, who were “probably not equipped to handle their departments”.

In 2014, a poll of 164 municipalities in six provinces by *City Press*, a national weekly newspaper, revealed that only 40% of municipal managers had met a deadline “to acquire the appropriate skills” for their jobs. The deadline had been set in a 2007 National Treasury

document, “Guidelines for Municipal Competency Levels”. Also in 2014, the minister of COGTA noted that out of 278 municipal chief financial officers (CFOs), managing about R320 billion (about \$28.9 billion in December of that year) in municipal budgets, 170 did not have appropriate qualifications for their jobs.


As part of its study, *City Press* cited the example of then municipal manager of Nama Khoi municipality in Springbok who had acquired his job, in 2011, on the basis of a Grade 9 education. The appointment was in direct breach of the 2007 national treasury directive. In the same year, the auditor-general (AG) found the municipality’s books were in a shambles. No wonder. The wrong captain was steering the ship.

It is further possible to distinguish a number of issues that contribute to the crippling lack of capacity in local governance in South Africa.

Firstly, the findings of AG reports are not enforceable by that office. The AG is a Chapter 9 institution, constitutionally established to “audit and report on the accounts, financial statements and financial management” of public departments and entities. Unlike the Public Protector (another Chapter 9 institution) the AG does not have the power to “take appropriate remedial action”. The AG submits its reports to politicians—council mayors, legislatures, parliament and ministers. It is up to them to act on the audit findings.

Some improvements in accountability by municipalities are observable in the AG’s annual reports on local government. Presently,

South Africa: reasons for protests, 2012-2014



Source: Civic Protests Barometer 2007-2014

local government consists of 278 municipalities and 57 municipal entities, or organisations used by municipalities to deliver services, including utility companies. Of these institutions, in 2007/8 only 2% received audit results that were unqualified with no findings, the best possible evaluation. This improved to 17% in 2013/14. But even with these improvements some 47% of the municipalities received reports as follows:

- qualified with findings (24%), where financial reports conformed to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), except for a few areas;
- adverse with findings (1%), where audited financial statements do not reflect the municipality’s performance fairly and there is lack of conformity with GAAP;
- disclaimed with findings (18%), where the AG elects not to issue an opinion, mainly because significant uncertainty exists over parts or all of the financial statements submitted by affected municipalities; and
- outstanding reports (4%), where no

financial statements were prepared for the AG to receive and carry out the audits.

These municipalities collectively manage a budget of R76.6 billion (\$5.07 billion in 2015). That is a lot of money in a country facing serious fiscal challenges. Without effective governance, billions of rands will continue to be squandered. The exact losses from municipal mismanagement are not easy to tally but they fall under staggering estimates of the cost of corruption and fruitless expenditure to the country. In 2011 the Council for the Advancement of the South African Constitution estimated that some 20% of the country's annual GDP was being lost to corruption and fruitless expenditure. In January 2015 the Institute for Internal Auditors claimed that South Africa had lost R700 billion (about \$55.16 billion in 2015) to corruption since 1994.

In 2009 the government found that “the financial environment in municipalities is a highly problematic area—at worst it is fraught with both a poor skills base, weak support from provinces, and then open to abuse and fraudulent activity.” Unfortunately, however, this same government has not succeeded in reversing this trend.

Secondly, a legislative defect protects constituency-based town councillors from real accountability to their electorates. The electoral system at the local government level is hybrid, and includes an element of constituency-related activities as well as proportional representation. In the former, citizens in a specific ward directly elect the individual they

want to be a ward councillor; in the latter, citizens cast a vote for a political party and it is a party that decides who occupies (in proportion to its gains) the council seat(s) reserved for proportional representation lists.

However, once elected, councillors are beholden to the whims of the party that nominated them. A political party can recall a councillor if it is displeased with that person for some reason. Internal party politics therefore exert an influence on many councillors—even those who are performing well.

In the Eastern Cape province, for instance, the African National Congress (ANC) provincial leadership listed several municipalities as “hot spots” of factionalism, as reported in a February 2013 article in the *Daily Dispatch*, an Eastern Cape newspaper. The provincial treasurer, Thandiswa Marawu, admitted that “factional battles were adversely affecting service delivery” in these municipalities. (This conclusion overlaps with GGA's rankings of the municipality performance—see page 91.) In Mbashe and Mnquma, several councillors were expelled from the party for defying party directives.

Thirdly, it is evident that the ruling elite has political interests as regards the disbursement of municipal funds. The “political-administrative interface”, a phrase of Professor Christopher Thornhill's, professor emeritus of the University of Pretoria, is mired in overlaps, and a complete separation of the two is impossible. In South Africa, divisions between politics and administration as delineated by legislation are not being respected. More often than not, the mayor and the

municipal manager belong to the same political party. The latter, who is also the council's chief accounting officer, may find him- or herself drawn into political considerations with regard to the disbursement of funds.


As a result, the Municipal Systems Amendment Act of 2011 has been implemented half-heartedly at best. The purpose of the Act was to minimise and terminate the practice of “cadre deployment” to critical official positions in municipalities, but this practice has persisted. No comprehensive figures are available on the number of under-skilled but politically connected officials currently in local government, even in reports by credible bodies such as Deloitte. However, the available figures on the number of qualified managers and CFOs who are employed in local government positions do allow a partial deduction of the state of affairs. Glenn Hollands, a development consultant, posits that this is a strategy that allows “the ruling party to supplement its control of most councils with pliant and often weak administrators, only too willing to take political direction”.

Fourthly, as noted above, there are indeed poor levels of appropriate knowledge and skills sets in local government all across the country. Over the last two decades, local government has consistently shown itself unable to attract relevant skills, which has resulted in a reliance on external consultants. Consultancy fees can deplete municipal budgets, thus affecting service delivery projects, including the ability to pay salaries.

Fifthly, and largely as a consequence of the lack of skills and knowledge

outlined above, many municipalities are dependent on consultancies for a range of services, including information communications technology, financial control mechanisms and project management. Even the conceptual work involved in formulating and writing an Integrated Development Plan (IDP)—a

Provincial shares of protests over time, %



Source: Civic Protests Barometer 2007-2014

five-year detailed plan on development priorities for a particular municipality, and a legal requirement—is often outsourced.

IDPs are linked to the municipalities' budgets and all relevant stakeholders within their jurisdiction, including contractors, suppliers and local residents, should be involved in their formulation. However, since they are often formulated by external consultants who are not accountable to citizens, members of municipal councils are not usually full custodians of their IDPs.

Lastly, citizens are disengaged from local government. This is at least partly a result of the minimal involvement in planning on the part of elected officials noted above. Because they are not committed to their IDPs,

they discourage interactions with the public, or avoid them, or behave in ways that are inappropriate to their roles as public officials. This results from what Zwelinzima Vavi, former Congress of South African Trade Unions secretary-general, calls “a growing social distance between leadership and our mass constituency”.

In 2012, Dr Mamphela Ramphele, a senior academic—and, at the time, a prospective politician—observed that the country needed an active citizenry to “mobilise citizens to voice their rights and exercise their responsibilities”. In reality, where they have no further recourse, citizens in poor or marginal communities who experience official obfuscation or poor service are resorting to protest.

This list of challenges might

Political infighting can also cost the ruling party its hold on some wards.

make the overall problem look insurmountable, but there are a number of specific and concrete proposals/ideas that policymakers could consider.

Clearly the AG’s office needs more teeth and reach. Currently the AG’s reports depend on organisations and people in the political arena—councils, legislature and parliament—for their implementation. Where political high stakes are involved, the AG’s reports are likely to face inaction, even where they address technical and professional

aspects of municipal governance, such as financial management.

The AG needs to be empowered to require the National Prosecuting Authority to act on his or her recommendations regarding poor financial practice in local government. In particular, the AG should be empowered to institute sanctions, including the prosecution of local government officials who are identified as having participated in corruption and mismanagement. The requisite legislative instruments are already in place, including the Municipal Financial Management Act, the Public Management Finance Act and Treasury Regulations.

Local officials can be vulnerable to internal party conflicts and interests. Often, this stimulates intra-political party tensions in a local community, to the detriment of service delivery. In July 2013, this was evident in Tlokwe local municipality (formerly Potchefstroom) in the North West province, when ANC councillors acted in concert with the opposition to remove a mayor alleged to be involved in corruption. The said ANC councillors were reprimanded by their party, which sparked intra-political party tensions that weakened the party’s public standing. In addition, the amount of time the affected councillors devoted to the issue also detracted from the municipality’s functioning.

Political infighting can also cost the ruling party its hold on some wards. In January 2014, for instance, the Johannesburg-based daily, *Business Day*, reported that the ANC had suspended 16 of its councillors in March 2013 in the Mbhashe municipality in the

Eastern Cape for their role in ousting a sitting ANC mayor in their council. The mayor had been accused of tender irregularities, but the ANC chose to protect the incumbent.


In January 2014 the ANC then lost two wards out of the 12 it had held in the municipality before the resulting by-election: one to an independent candidate and the other to the United Democratic Movement according to a report by a Johannesburg-based news and opinion outlet, the *Daily Maverick*. “Ructions in a number of municipal councils in the province have contributed towards hampering services [sic] delivery,” then Member of the Executive Council for local government and traditional affairs in the province, Mlibo Qhoboshiyane, lamented in 2013.

Political parties that wish to recall a constituency-based councillor should be required to submit a request to do so to the electoral court, with supporting documentation. A recall should proceed only once the court is satisfied that the application is based on objective and rational grounds.

Presently, indeed, the opposite often happens: councillors who have been recalled approach the courts to challenge the decision. The function of a recalled councillor may be held in abeyance while a new candidate for the role is sought. Councillor positions may be left vacant for months due to legal battles fought by councillors against their suspensions, according to the afore-mentioned *Business Day* article.

It is also evident that the incumbents of local government positions need to demonstrate greater responsiveness to people’s needs and

South Africa: annual number of protests



Source: Civic Protests Barometer 2007-2014

a greater receptiveness to the need for institutional reforms such as the ones outlined here. At the same time, electorates must more actively ensure that they elect capable individuals of moral standing to local government positions. The main aim, at all times, must be to ensure that the existing

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laws relating to local governance are understood by all stakeholders and that they are enforced when necessary.

In mid-2015, a former municipal employee, the city manager of the Nelson Mandela Bay metropolitan municipality, Lindiwe Msengana-Ndlela, went to court to argue that Ben Fihla, an ANC-appointed mayor of the municipality, had interfered with her work and prevented her from making

senior appointments that would have helped to guard the municipality against irregular and unlawful expenditure. These allegations were confirmed to be credible by Judge Dayalin Chetty of the Eastern Cape High Court in May 2015. By then the ANC had appointed a new mayor, Danny Jordaan, a respected

accountability and consultation. Moreover, to maximise citizens' support of their municipal structures, the election of ward committees should occur simultaneously with that of councillors. **GGV**

Councillors can be educated
and trained on relevant
government legislation and
good governance practices.

football administrator, ahead of 2016 local elections.

In fact, the ruling party was facing mounting discontent over many failures in local governance in the municipality. In April 2015, the National Union of Metalworkers said that the city was “at risk of falling to the opposition [Democratic Alliance] because of the ANC’s weakness there”. Clearly the prospect of a democratic challenge to the power of incumbents can force them to do the right thing.

The timing of local government elections should also be reconsidered. They should take place six months before councillors assume office. This would allow for a period during which councillors can be educated and trained on relevant government legislation and good governance practices, such as those outlined in the King reports on corporate governance, as well as leadership practices of transparency,

South Africa: quality of government

The country's citizens are seriously concerned about the state of their national government

What the people really think

In most surveys of African governance South Africa appears as one of the best governed countries. Within South Africa, however, the picture is somewhat different. There is a high level of criticism of the executive, complaints that the legislature has been relegated to a minor position and much dispute over the role of the judiciary.

In addition many public institutions appear to be in a state of almost permanent crisis. This is true of the public broadcaster, the South African Broadcasting Corporation; of the National Prosecuting Authority; of the Post Office; South African Airways; the national oil company, PetroSA; the national power utility, Eskom and various other parastatals.

All of this has caused considerable public concern. In recent years the country has seen much social unrest and public protest, including disruptions in parliament, a student incursion into the parliamentary precinct, a series of student protests and a large march through Johannesburg to the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, as well as a continuing rhythm of service delivery protests.

We decided to test public attitudes towards key aspects of governance by including a number of questions in the Markdata Omnibus Survey of September 2015*. This survey consisted of a fully representative national sample of 2,245 respondents, weighted by race, gender, province and other key variables. The survey was conducted between 24 August and 30 September, at a time of some national disillusion provoked in particular by the decline of economic growth and the consequent rise in unemployment.

It was immediately clear that the public mood was sour and difficult.

* KPMG has agreed the statistical information in this report to the Markdata summary tables

Many of Markdata's interviewers were threatened while attempting to ask questions. Indeed one municipal councillor phoned up the head of Markdata and threatened her because he resented Markdata having come into "his" area to ask questions. Often it was clear that some public representatives and party officials were in extremely defensive moods, as if conscious of their own deficiencies. They expressed extreme resentment towards anyone asking "awkward" questions.

Everywhere, interviewers reported that there was greater sensitivity to survey questions than had been observed before. Questions that would previously have passed without comment now elicited querulous comment and disputation. In many cases interviewers felt they were encountering paranoia. In some cases, police had to be called to escort interviewers out of situations where their questioning had put them in situations of physical risk.

According to Markdata, such difficulties have not been confronted by interviewers in South Africa since the difficult days of the early 1990s when political tensions and violent conflict between the African National Congress (ANC) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) were at their height. Indeed, the responses were in some cases so extreme that the company indicated that it would be unlikely to undertake another such exercise.

A particular problem occurred in the Northern Cape. This province has a small population scattered over a wide area, and it has to be over-sampled in order to get enough respondents to be able to make significant statements about public attitudes there. Interviewers in this province met resistance from many respondents, who complained that they were being questioned by interviewers all the time. It was clear that a large number of surveys had been carried out in that province recently.

The reason may be that the Democratic Alliance (DA) has high hopes that its large following among the coloured population of the Western Cape will gradually seep over into the coloured population of the Northern Cape. This would likely be a matter of concern to the ANC—and a reason for both parties to do a lot of polling there.


We began by asking a general question: "How sensitive and accountable to the people do you think the government is?" Surveys often lead with a general question of this sort, such as asking people whether they expect tomorrow to be better than today. Clearly, in testing opinions about governance, accountability to the people is a prime concern.

We found that only 14.3% of all our respondents said that the government was completely accountable, while another 39.7% said it was partially accountable. That is, overall, some 54% found the government's accountability to be at least to some extent satisfactory. This is not a high figure when one considers that some 62% of the population had voted for the current government, according to the Independent Electoral Commission, and that ideally one would want everyone in a democracy to see the government as accountable.

How sensitive and accountable is the government?

Share of respondents, %

- Completely
- Partially
- Government only represents the interests of a small political class
- Government is even less accountable and sensitive to the needs of the people than the old apartheid government was



© GGA

However, we found that 21.6% agreed that “the government only really represents the interests of a small political class,” while another 24.3% agreed that “today’s government is even less accountable and sensitive to the needs of the people than the old apartheid government was.”

Taking these last two groups together, it emerges that almost 46% of respondents were quite radically disillusioned with government accountability to the public and, indeed, felt that it hardly existed at all. It was noticeable that men were more disillusioned than women, with nearly 49% expressing radically disillusioned views compared to 43.4% of women.

When we looked at the responses by age our expectation was that younger voters would be more disillusioned than the old, for several reasons. First, the old have been beneficiaries of the equalisation of pensions—a major benefit for which many remain grateful. Secondly, the young bear the brunt of high unemployment. Finally, it would be reasonable to suppose that many of the older generation are long-time ANC supporters and have strong emotional reasons for supporting the present government, while the younger “born-frees” are generally less aligned, did not experience the anti-apartheid struggle and are more focused on other things.

It was accordingly a surprise to find that there was little difference among the age groups and that some 51.2% of those aged 45–54 fell into the radically disillusioned group. This was a striking finding: this age group consists of mature people of working age with experience both of apartheid and the struggle against it. They are parents, sometimes grand-parents, and they all saw Mandela walk free and become president. One suspects their expectations were once sky-high—but they are now disappointed.

However, no inferences should be drawn from this data that the respondents had necessarily changed their party affiliation. We did not ask a question about party choice. Previous studies show that even when people become very disillusioned, their partisan attachment is almost the last thing to change. However, such a degree of disillusionment among the electorate would be consistent either with some degree of partisan change or at least with lower turn-out. People who believe that government is not accountable may see little sense in voting.

We expected to find that the white minority was particularly disillusioned with the government but expected that most black voters would remain loyal to it. However, when we analysed our respondents by race, we found a more complex picture. Among black voters 60.3% found the

government partially and completely accountable, though only 15.1% thought it completely accountable. But 21.2% said the government really represented only a small political class and 18.4% said the government was even less accountable to the people than the old apartheid government had been. Thus almost 40% of black respondents fell into the radically disillusioned group.

Turning to the minorities, we found that whites were actually less disillusioned than either coloured or Asian people. Remarkably, no less than 49.8% of coloured people thought that the old apartheid government had been more accountable than the present one. All told, 70.2% of coloureds were in the radically disillusioned group, as were 68.7% of Asians and 67.4% of whites. A polity in which minority groups are so disillusioned is clearly not a healthy one.

The better educated respondents were, the more they felt government was unaccountable. Among those with Matric or tertiary education this proportion rose to almost half. However, even in the least educated group—those with no education or less than Grade 5 education—nearly a third fell into the radically disillusioned group.

We then looked at results by province. Here we expected to find that ANC-ruled provinces would show higher levels of satisfaction with government accountability, while the DA-ruled Western Cape would presumably be the most disillusioned. This turned out not to be true.

Strikingly, in the Northern Cape no less than 52.5% said that today's government was less accountable than the old apartheid government had been, while some 40.3% of respondents in the Free State, an ANC fiefdom, were equally disillusioned. It was also a surprise to find that no less than 41.6% of respondents in KwaZulu-Natal were among the radically disillusioned—that is, both those who thought that the government represented a small political class and those who thought that it was less accountable than the apartheid government. Although KwaZulu-Natal is the heartland of the current president Jacob Zuma's ANC, only 11% of respondents there thought the government was completely accountable. This was a lower figure than all but two of the provinces and lower even than in the DA-ruled

The better educated respondents were, the more they felt government was unaccountable.

Western Cape.


However, the lowest percentage of people who felt that the government was completely accountable was Limpopo with 8.2%—despite the fact that it has the highest ANC majority in the country. In Gauteng—the country’s economic hub—only 9% felt the government was fully accountable, while no less than 57.3% fell into the radically disillusioned group.

When we looked at the data by language group it was no surprise to find that Afrikaans-speakers (of all races) were the most disillusioned, with some 53.8% saying that the government was less accountable than the old apartheid government and only 6.8% saying the government was completely accountable.

Among black respondents we found that those speaking Nguni languages (siSwazi, isiNdebele, isiZulu and isiXhosa) were the least disillusioned—perhaps because

these groups have long been dominant in the ruling party. Nonetheless, some 35.9% of Nguni-speakers fell into the radically disillusioned group—a high figure and not far behind the 37.4% of radically disillusioned that we found among speakers of Sesotho-Setswana languages (such as Northern Sotho, Southern Sotho, Sepedi and Setswana).

There appears to be a direct relationship between income level and disillusionment. The higher the income the more the disillusionment. Thus, some



34.1% of those with a monthly income of R16,000 or more thought that the government was less accountable than the old apartheid government had been.


As one went down the scale that figure shrank, so that among those with no income at all, only 6.9% fell into this most disillusioned category. This likely reflects the importance of social grants to this bottom group.

Equally when we moved to the more sophisticated Living Standards Measurement (LSM) Index, consisting of many different variables, such as ownership of cars and major appliances, we again noticed this strong relationship. Among the top group on the LSM Index (1-4) no less than 65.3% fell into the radically disillusioned group, while among those in the lowest LSM group (8-10) only 13.8% did.

Handling the economy

We followed this general question about accountability with a central question on why the economy was not faring well. The answers we got were deafening. Only 12.4% of all respondents accepted the government's explanation that "the people in government are generally competent and not corrupt. Other factors have caused the economy to falter." No less than 78.7% of respondents believed that "the people in government are incompetent and corrupt and are indeed to blame for the poor state of the economy."

It is not often in opinion surveys that one finds such an overwhelming predominance of one opinion. Again, we had expected that older people, with their longer attachment to the ANC and experience of the struggle, would take a kindlier view of government. But this turned out not to be true. Those aged over 55 were even more critical of the government, with



82.4% of them blaming the government for the state of the economy and only 10.1% accepting the government's explanation.

When we looked at the answers to this question in terms of language groups, we expected speakers of Nguni languages to be far more favourable to the government, for these groups have provided the ANC's leadership for the last 50 years. In fact they diverged very little from the average in their response to this question.

By far the most critical group were Afrikaans-speakers (of all races), with 89.3% blaming government incompetence and corruption for the poor state of the economy and only 4.2% accepting the government view. This is as close to unanimity as one will ever find in an opinion survey.

There was little difference in the response to this question among different income groups, with the most critical being the unemployed, followed by those with a household income of at least R5,000 per month. Interestingly, those apparently least in agreement with the statement earned R1 – R4,999, and most likely included social grant recipients. What was particularly striking was that the respondents who represent the bulk of the government's tax base were completely alienated and clearly believed that government incompetence and corruption were responsible for the poor state of the economy.

We expected to find that black respondents would be far more favourable to the government than others. In fact this was only marginally true. Some 76.8% of black voters blamed government incompetence and corruption for the state of the economy, though this figure rose to 84.9% among coloureds, 85.3% among whites and 89.8% among Asians.


As we had expected, respondents in the (DA-ruled) Western Cape were among the most critical, with 88.3% blaming government incompetence and corruption, but opinion in the Free State was almost equally skewed, with 87% taking the same view. Both of them were surpassed, however, by respondents in the Northern Cape, where we saw the extraordinary distribution of 92.5% to 2.4% taking a harshly critical view.

Service delivery

Next we turned to the question of service delivery. Some 17.1% of all respondents thought that "the current government is trying its best to deliver good services to everyone and under it service delivery has improved." Slightly more critical was the opinion held by 32.4% that "service delivery

is not very good despite the government's best efforts".

However, another 32% said bluntly that "service delivery is not good because the government does not really care about the masses," while the remaining 16.2% said that "service delivery was worse under this government than it had been under apartheid." Thus the electorate falls into two almost exactly equal halves: those willing to take a reasonably charitable view of the government's efforts at service delivery and those who are radically disillusioned. This is an interesting finding, since the electorate is far from being evenly split when it comes to partisan choice.



There were, however, strong racial differences in response to this question. Only 10.2% of black respondents thought that service delivery was now worse than under apartheid, while no less than 42% of whites took this view. On this question whites were more disillusioned than either Asians or coloureds.


There was also a notable correlation with language. Some 44.6% of Afrikaans-speakers thought that service delivery was now worse than under apartheid, but this view was taken by only 24.5% of English speakers and 7.8% of Nguni language speakers. Those with higher education were notably more likely to take a highly critical view of government service delivery.

When we looked at the situation by province, the Western Cape stood out with only 9.8% saying that service delivery had improved under the current government and 29.1% saying that the government did not really care about the masses, which was why service delivery was bad. No fewer than 37% said that service delivery had been better under apartheid. Once again, opinion in both the Free State and Northern Cape was far more critical than elsewhere.

Government performance

a) Employment

Next we asked respondents to rate government performance on a series of issues beginning with the most important of all, employment. Overall, some 12.2% thought the government's performance was positive on this issue, although 70.1% had a negative view, with older people again the most



critical. When we looked at responses by race, we found that Asians took the most critical view, with some 83.6% taking a negative view and only 5.3% a positive one, whereas blacks also took a negative view, by 68.8% to 13.1% respectively.

This must be seen as reflecting several different realities. Black voters, though most affected by unemployment, are also those most torn by partisan loyalties to the ANC. The strength of Asian feeling on this issue most likely reflects concerns about unemployment, among other issues.

When we looked at replies by province, the picture was sharply different than on previous questions. While Western Cape voters were only averagely critical about this issue, the provinces with the most negative views about the government's performance on employment were the Eastern Cape (74%), Limpopo (76.2%) and Gauteng (77.2%). It would appear that on this cardinal issue, the fact that unemployment is much higher in, for example, the Eastern Cape than in the Western Cape, trumps partisan attachments in forming opinions on this issue.

b) Pensions

Next we turned to the question of the government's performance on pensions. Opinion here was far more positive: some 50.5% of all respondents thought the government had done well on this issue as compared to 30.5% who took a contrary view, with older voters naturally being more positive than the younger ones.

There is no doubt that the government is still drawing great credit from one of the decisions that it took almost immediately when it came to office in 1994, to equalise all state pensions at the level paid to whites. This decision has been of fundamental importance in the black community.


Members of the minorities, on the other hand, are more likely to feel aggrieved that their pensions from employment by the state in schools, universities or parastatals have almost always failed to keep up with inflation. Hence the racially skewed response to this question.

Black voters gave government performance on this issue a positive rating, by 65.3% to 18.0%. Although half of all white, Asian and coloured voters gave the government a negative rating on this issue, nearly a third gave it a positive score.

c) Social grants

Much the same situation obtained when we asked respondents to rate the government's performance on social grants. This, it should be recalled, was an entirely ANC initiative—there was no comparable programme under apartheid—and the number of recipients of social grants has now swollen to over 18 million.

The benefit to the poorer members of the black community has been enormous, and it has helped to revitalise the old bantustan areas of South



Africa, which were badly hit both by the abolition of bantustan employment and the border industries policy. Overall our respondents gave the government a positive rating on this issue by 61.2% to 21.6%, but among black voters the figures were 70.6% to 14.2%.

Again, among the minorities about half were critical of the government's performance on this issue as compared to nearly 30%, who gave it a positive rating. This likely reflects concern among the minorities over the financial sustainability of the social grant system. However, the figures discussed above still show a fairly moderate tenor of opinion when one considers that this is probably one of the most heavily redistributive measures that the government has passed.

Sharply different views on this issue were expressed by respondents in the different provinces. While only 27.3% of respondents in the Western Cape gave the government a positive rating on social grants, this figure rose to over 70% in the Eastern Cape, the North West and Limpopo, with the peak reached in KwaZulu-Natal with a 72.7% positive rating.

The Western Cape was, indeed, the only province where more respondents took a negative view than a positive one on this issue. When we looked at responses to this question by income group, it was striking that those with higher incomes—and who are therefore largely paying for the social grants, while themselves receiving no benefit from them—nonetheless took a positive view. Even among those in our top income category (household income of R16,000 a month or more) opinion was positive on this issue by a 2:1 majority.


d) Education and health

We then tested respondents' views about the government's performance on education and health. Responses to these two questions were very similar, with around one third of all respondents giving the government a positive rating and around 44% giving it a negative score.

However, when we analysed respondents' views by race, a very different picture emerged. It must be remembered that black voters have been on the receiving end of the government's poor performance as regards township schooling and the disorganised condition of state hospitals. Nonetheless black voters gave the government a positive rating on education by 41.2% to 38.3%. On health, however, this reversed to a 41.1% negative vote to 35% positive.

Opinion among the three minority groups was massively negative on both issues. Asians were the most critical of all, rating the government negatively on education by 72.2% to 16.7% and by 68% to 14.3 % on health.

It seems clear that partisan attachment affected the answers to these questions very significantly. This became clear when we looked at responses by province. The Western Cape yielded the most negative attitudes on these two issues, with over 60% rating the government negatively on health



and education and only a sixth of respondents giving it a positive rating.

The most striking results elsewhere were in the Northern Cape, where the government's performance on health got a 52.7% negative rating as against only 20.5% positive. In ANC-ruled provinces such as the Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal and the North West respondents gave a predominantly positive rating to the government's performance on education. Yet, in Limpopo (an equally ANC-ruled province), some 58.5% of respondents rated the government negatively as against 28.2% who were positive. It would seem that the state's failure to deliver school books to Limpopo schools has had a major effect on opinion there.


e) Law and order and equality for women

We then asked respondents to rate the government's performance on law and order and on equality for women. On the latter question, opinions split exactly into equal thirds, with one third giving the government a positive, one third negative and one third giving a neutral rating.

There was very little difference between groups on these issues—not even gender made much difference to responses. One suspects that this

is an indication that gender equality is not seen as an important issue by most voters and that very few respondents had strong feelings one way or the other.

Law and order was quite different. Some 56.7 % of all respondents rated the government negatively on this issue as against the 16.5% who gave it a positive score. When we analysed responses by race, we found that blacks gave a 51.4% negative rating on this issue and that only 18.9% rated the



government's performance positively. This was dwarfed by the furious disapproval of all three minorities, peaking again among Asians: some 84.2% of Asians rated the government negatively as against only 4.9% who gave it a positive rating.

When we looked at responses to this issue by province, the Western Cape stood out, with respondents negative by a 7:1 proportion. In no province did the government get a mainly positive rating on this issue.

Limpopo, Free State and the North West were far less negative than others, although in both the Eastern and Northern Cape over 60% of respondents marked the government poorly on this issue. According to social contract theory, the fundamental contract between people and government is that the people will surrender power to the state on the understanding that the state will provide the protection of law and order in return. It is clear that this part of the social contract has thoroughly broken down in South Africa.

A law-abiding government?

We then asked respondents whether they believed that the government itself observed the law and also made sure that the police obeyed the law and protected the citizens. Overall we found that 44.2% agreed with that statement but that 49.6% disagreed, with people over the age of 45 much more likely to take a negative view.

A small majority (50.6%) of black respondents agreed with the

statement, with some 44.1% dissenting. All three of the minorities strongly dissented: whites by 66.5% to 23.2%, coloureds even more heavily by 70.6% to 20.3%, and Asians most of all by 75.7% to 15.9%. This is clearly a very unhealthy situation: the minority groups have completely lost confidence in both the government and the police, while black citizens are not much more than evenly split on this subject.


When we examined the results by province we found that respondents in the Western Cape had completely lost confidence in the government and police to obey the law, with 75.2% dissenting and only 17.9% expressing faith in the government and police. Elsewhere opinion was evenly divided, with the exception of Gauteng, where only 38.8% agreed with the statement while 52.4% dissented.

In Limpopo, however, a large majority (69.1%) expressed confidence in the government and police, with only 30.1% dissenting. Ominously we found that better educated respondents were, the more likely they were to express scepticism that the government and police would observe the law.

Similarly, the upper income groups were heavily negative. Once again it would appear that the groups upon which the government depends for its tax base are also those most likely to believe that the social contract between people and government has been broken.

The five freedoms

We then asked respondents whether they felt that the government ensured that human rights were respected—freedom of speech, freedom of



the press, religion, assembly and the right to a fair trial. This should have been favourable ground for the government, because the end of apartheid brought with it an end to press censorship, to constraints on freedom of speech and assembly and an end to bannings, detentions without trial and so on. This has been the great human rights triumph of post-apartheid South Africa.

It was thus a surprise to find that opinion was almost equally divided on this question, with some 47.7% agreeing with the statement but 46.2% dissenting. As with the previous question, the same pattern was visible when we looked at responses by racial group, with the three minorities strongly dissenting from the statement, particularly the Asians. Black respondents narrowly agreed with the statement by 53% to 42.3%.

Again we found that respondents in the Western Cape were the most likely to dissent from the statement by 61.5% to 29.1%. Rather to our surprise, the Eastern Cape also showed a majority (54.3%) dissenting from the statement. This was the only other province where that was true, although opinion in Gauteng, Free State and Mpumalanga was evenly split.

Are the people heard?


Finally, we reminded respondents that the ANC's slogan was "The People Shall Govern" and asked them how that tallied with the fact that fewer and fewer people were bothering to vote. Overall, some 56.2% of respondents agreed with the statement that "people are giving up hope that the government will listen to them", with only 29.7% dissenting. It was noticeable that this opinion was particularly strongly held by young voters aged 16–24: the so-called "born-frees".

It was therefore no surprise to find that the three racial minorities were strongly of the view that people were giving up hope of being heard by the government—while a clear majority among black voters felt the same, by 54.2% to 31%. Again, coloured and Asian respondents were strikingly more disillusioned than whites.

The Western Cape showed a large majority (67.1%) of people agreeing that citizens were giving up hope of being heard, but it was notable that even larger majorities with the same view were found in the Northern Cape (78%) and Limpopo (74.1%). In every province except Gauteng and Mpumalanga, large majorities felt that people were giving up hope—and even there more people felt so than otherwise.

When we analysed the results by income we found that the group most likely to believe that people were giving up hope was not (as we had imagined) either the unemployed or the rich but rather the lower-middle and upper working classes, with a household income of between R5,000 and R10,000 a month.

The results of this survey suggest that South Africa is experiencing a full-blown crisis of governance. The disillusionment with government is very wide and deep. The fact that substantial numbers of respondents of all races were willing to compare the present government unfavourably with its apartheid predecessor—in ordinary social discourse, a completely taboo opinion—is some measure of how deep public alienation now is.



The number of loyalists who would take the side of the present government on questions concerning accountability, competency, service delivery, law and order and employment was as low as 11%-15%. To say that public confidence in the governing institutions of society has broken down would be a large understatement.

On many issues respondents expressed an overwhelming cynicism suggestive of a complete breakdown of the social contract between government and those governed. Just three factors sustain the current regime of governance in public opinion: a habitual—though clearly fraying—loyalty to the ruling party among many black people; a vestigial gratitude for the fact that pensions are provided; and the system of social grants.

The situation revealed by this survey is dangerous in two respects. First, the three racial minorities have lost almost all faith in the government to be responsive, law-abiding, honest or competent. This means that the governing institutions can effectively look only to a section (and by no means always a majority section) of the remaining racial group for confidence and support.

Second, South Africa is entering a period of economic hard times, of


high unemployment and the great stresses exercised by a harsh drought, with water shortages and higher food prices, among other problems. If the governing institutions are to come through such a testing period, it is

It is a dangerous situation in any society where a majority does not believe that the rule of law will be honestly maintained, and where it feels that the taxes it pays will be wasted by corrupt and incompetent officials.

essential that the public has an underlying confidence in the justice and public-spiritedness of the governance to which they are subject. But, even at the outset of this recession, that confidence is simply lacking.

It is already the case that the overwhelming majority of respondents blame government corruption and incompetence for these economic woes and that they reject its argument that factors beyond its control

are responsible for the downturn. This situation is responsible for a whole series of social ills—a lack of civic trust, tax evasion, capital flight and even criminal behaviour.

It is a dangerous situation in any society where a majority does not believe that the rule of law will be honestly maintained, and where it feels that the taxes it pays will be wasted by corrupt and incompetent officials. This is a recipe for the Wild West, if not a Hobbesian state of nature. If the downturn is prolonged, the governance of our society will be even more keenly tested. 

SA local government: rankings

GGA Government Performance Index 2016®

Our survey of the country's 234 local municipalities reveals a pattern of extremes

| National rank | Municipality | Province | Governing party | Provincial rank | Municipality | Governing party |
|---------------|-------------------|----------|-----------------|-----------------|------------------------|-----------------|
| 1 | Swellendam | WC | DA-ACDP | Eastern Cape | | |
| 2 | Hessequa | WC | DA | 1 | Kouga | ANC |
| 3 | Bergrivier | WC | DA | 2 | Baviaans | DA |
| 4 | Swartland | WC | DA | 3 | Camdeboo | ANC |
| 5 | Mossel Bay | WC | DA | 4 | Inxuba Yethemba | ANC |
| 6 | Langeberg | WC | DA | 5 | Gariep | ANC |
| 7 | Overstrand | WC | DA | 6 | Kou-Kamma | ANC |
| 8 | Saldanha | WC | DA | 7 | Nxuba | ANC |
| 9 | Emthanjeni | NC | ANC | 8 | Maletswai | ANC |
| 10 | Witzenberg | WC | DA-COPE-DCP-IND | 9 | Ndlambe | ANC |
| 11 | Cape Agulhas | WC | ANC | 10 | Nelson Mandela Bay | ANC |
| 12 | Beaufort West | WC | ANC | 11 | Blue Crane Route | ANC |
| 13 | Prince Albert | WC | ANC | 12 | Makana | ANC* |
| 14 | Hantam | NC | DA-COPE | 13 | Lukhanji | ANC |
| 15 | Matzikama | WC | ANC | 14 | Ikwezi | ANC |
| 16 | Drakenstein | WC | DA | 15 | Inkwanca | ANC |
| 17 | Richtersveld | NC | ANC | 16 | Buffalo City | ANC |
| 18 | George | WC | DA | 17 | Nkonkobe | ANC |
| 19 | Metsimaholo | FS | ANC | 18 | Tsolwana | ANC |
| 20 | Dihlabeng | FS | ANC | 19 | Amahlathi | ANC |
| 21 | //Khara Hais | NC | ANC | 20 | Senqu | ANC |
| 22 | Lesedi | GP | ANC | 21 | Sundays River Valley | ANC |
| 23 | Ngwathe | FS | ANC | 22 | Sakhisizwe | ANC |
| 24 | Kopanong | FS | ANC | 23 | Elundini | ANC |
| 25 | City of Cape Town | WC | DA | 24 | Ngqushwa | ANC |
| 26 | Kouga | EC | ANC | 25 | Emalahleni | ANC |
| 27 | Mangaung | FS | ANC | 26 | Great Kei | ANC |
| 28 | Kwa Sani | KZN | ANC | 27 | Matatiele | ANC |
| 29 | Cederberg | WC | ANC | 28 | King Sabata Dalindyebo | ANC |
| 30 | Baviaans | EC | DA | 29 | Umzimvubu | ANC |
| 31 | Stellenbosch | WC | DA | 30 | Mnquma | ANC |
| 32 | Bitou | WC | DA | 31 | Nyandeni | ANC |
| 33 | Camdeboo | EC | ANC | 32 | Port St Johns | ANC |
| 34 | Govan Mbeki | MP | ANC | 33 | Intsika Yethu | ANC |
| 35 | Breede Valley | WC | DA | 34 | Mhlontlo | ANC |
| 36 | Umsobomvu | NC | ANC | 35 | Engcobo | ANC |
| 37 | Tswelopele | FS | ANC | 36 | Mbhashe | ANC |
| 38 | Khâi-Ma | NC | ANC | 37 | Ingquza Hill | ANC |
| 39 | Mantsopa | FS | ANC | 38 | Ntabankulu | ANC |

| National rank | Municipality | Province | Governing party |
|---------------|----------------------|----------|-----------------|
| 40 | Lekwa | MP | ANC |
| 41 | Moqhaka | FS | ANC |
| 42 | City of Johannesburg | GP | ANC |
| 43 | Laingsburg | WC | DA-COPE |
| 44 | Inxuba Yethemba | EC | ANC |
| 45 | Nama Khoi | NC | ANC |
| 46 | uMngeni | KZN | ANC |
| 47 | Gariep | EC | ANC |
| 48 | Knysna | WC | DA |
| 49 | City of Matlosana | NW | ANC* |
| 50 | Steve Tshwete | MP | ANC |
| 51 | Gamagara | NC | ANC |
| 52 | Mogale City | GP | ANC |
| 53 | Theewaterskloof | WC | DA |
| 54 | Thaba Chweu | MP | ANC |
| 55 | Greater Kokstad | KZN | ANC |
| 56 | Nketoana | FS | ANC |
| 57 | uMhlathuze | KZN | ANC |
| 58 | Kgatelopele | NC | ANC |
| 59 | Modimolle | LP | ANC |
| 60 | Bela-Bela | LP | ANC |
| 61 | Mafube | FS | ANC |
| 62 | Letsemeng | FS | ANC |
| 63 | Lephalale | LP | ANC |
| 64 | Moses Kotane | NW | ANC |
| 65 | City of Tshwane | GP | ANC |
| 66 | Tokologo | FS | ANC |
| 67 | Midvaal | GP | DA |
| 68 | Naledi | FS | ANC |
| 69 | Kou-Kamma | EC | ANC |
| 70 | eThekwini | KZN | ANC |
| 71 | Merafong City | GP | ANC |
| 72 | Setsoto | FS | ANC |
| 73 | Nxuba | EC | ANC |
| 74 | Oudtshoorn | WC | ANC* |
| 75 | Naledi | NW | ANC |
| 76 | Emfuleni | GP | ANC |
| 77 | Maletswai | EC | ANC |
| 78 | Ndlambe | EC | ANC |
| 79 | Siyathemba | NC | ANC |
| 80 | Endumeni | KZN | ANC |
| 81 | Karoo Hoogland | NC | DA-COPE |

| Provincial rank | Municipality | Governing party |
|-----------------|----------------------|-----------------|
| 39 | Mbizana | ANC |
| Free State | | |
| 1 | Metsimaholo | ANC |
| 2 | Dihlabeng | ANC |
| 3 | Ngwathe | ANC |
| 4 | Kopanong | ANC |
| 5 | Mangaung | ANC |
| 6 | Tswelopele | ANC |
| 7 | Mantsopa | ANC |
| 8 | Moqhaka | ANC |
| 9 | Nketoana | ANC |
| 10 | Mafube | ANC |
| 11 | Letsemeng | ANC |
| 12 | Tokologo | ANC |
| 13 | Naledi | ANC |
| 14 | Setsoto | ANC |
| 15 | Matjhabeng | ANC |
| 16 | Masilonyana | ANC |
| 17 | Mohokare | ANC |
| 18 | Nala | ANC |
| 19 | Phumelela | ANC |
| 20 | Maluti-A-Phofung | ANC |
| Gauteng | | |
| 1 | Lesedi | ANC |
| 2 | City of Johannesburg | ANC |
| 3 | Mogale City | ANC |
| 4 | City of Tshwane | ANC |
| 5 | Midvaal | DA |
| 6 | Merafong City | ANC |
| 7 | Emfuleni | ANC |
| 8 | Ekurhuleni | ANC |
| 9 | Randfontein | ANC |
| 10 | Westonaria | ANC |
| KwaZulu-Natal | | |
| 1 | Kwa Sani | ANC |
| 2 | uMngeni | ANC |
| 3 | Greater Kokstad | ANC |
| 4 | uMhlathuze | ANC |
| 5 | eThekwini | ANC |
| 6 | Endumeni | ANC |
| 7 | Emnambithi-Ladysmith | ANC |
| 8 | Newcastle | ANC |

| National rank | Municipality | Province | Governing party |
|---------------|----------------------|----------|-----------------|
| 82 | Sol Plaatje | NC | ANC |
| 83 | Mookgophong | LP | ANC |
| 84 | Kamiesberg | NC | ANC |
| 85 | Nelson Mandela Bay | EC | ANC |
| 86 | Kannaland | WC | ICOSA -ANC |
| 87 | Matjhabeng | FS | ANC |
| 88 | Kareeberg | NC | ANC |
| 89 | Blue Crane Route | EC | ANC |
| 90 | Masilonyana | FS | ANC |
| 91 | Emakhazeni | MP | ANC |
| 92 | Pixley ka Isaka Seme | MP | ANC |
| 93 | Thembelihle | NC | ANC |
| 94 | Umjindi | MP | ANC |
| 95 | Renosterberg | NC | ANC |
| 96 | Victor Khanye | MP | ANC |
| 97 | Ekurhuleni | GP | ANC |
| 98 | Mohokare | FS | ANC |
| 99 | Emnambithi-Ladysmith | KZN | ANC |
| 100 | Kai !Garib | NC | ANC |
| 101 | Nala | FS | ANC |
| 102 | Makana | EC | ANC* |
| 103 | Randfontein | GP | ANC |
| 104 | Newcastle | KZN | ANC |
| 105 | Lukhanji | EC | ANC |
| 106 | Umdoni | KZN | ANC |
| 107 | Mandeni | KZN | ANC |
| 108 | KwaDukuza | KZN | ANC |
| 109 | Ikwezi | EC | ANC |
| 110 | Ubuntu | NC | ANC |
| 111 | Mogalakwena | LP | ANC |
| 112 | Dipaleseng | MP | ANC |
| 113 | Tlokwe | NW | ANC |
| 114 | Mpofana | KZN | ANC |
| 115 | Hibiscus Coast | KZN | ANC |
| 116 | Msukaligwa | MP | ANC |
| 117 | Msunduzi | KZN | ANC |
| 118 | Mbombela | MP | ANC |
| 119 | Polokwane | LP | ANC |
| 120 | Inkwanca | EC | ANC |
| 121 | Tsantsabane | NC | ANC |
| 122 | Buffalo City | EC | ANC |
| 123 | Phumelela | FS | ANC |

| Provincial rank | Municipality | Governing party |
|-----------------|--------------------|-----------------|
| 9 | Umdoni | ANC |
| 10 | Mandeni | ANC |
| 11 | KwaDukuza | ANC |
| 12 | Mpofana | ANC |
| 13 | Hibiscus Coast | ANC |
| 14 | Msunduzi | ANC |
| 15 | AbaQulusi | ANC |
| 16 | Richmond | ANC |
| 17 | Ulundi | IFP |
| 18 | Dannhauser | ANC |
| 19 | uMtshezi | ANC |
| 20 | Mthonjaneni | ANC-NFP |
| 21 | uMshwathi | ANC |
| 22 | Ingwe | ANC |
| 23 | Impendle | ANC |
| 24 | Ezinqoleni | ANC |
| 25 | eDumbe | NFP |
| 26 | eMadlangeni | ANC |
| 27 | Big Five False Bay | IFP |
| 28 | Mkhambathini | ANC |
| 29 | Nkandla | IFP |
| 30 | uPhongolo | ANC |
| 31 | Okhahlamba | ANC |
| 32 | uMfolozi | ANC |
| 33 | Umvoti | ANC |
| 34 | uMuziwabantu | ANC |
| 35 | Nquthu | ANC-NFP |
| 36 | uMzimkhulu | ANC |
| 37 | Mtubatuba | ANC |
| 38 | uMlalazi | ANC |
| 39 | Indaka | ANC-NFP* |
| 40 | Nongoma | NFP |
| 41 | Ubuhlebezwe | ANC |
| 42 | Hlabisa | IFP |
| 43 | Jozini | ANC |
| 44 | Imbabazane | ANC* |
| 45 | Msinga | IFP |
| 46 | Umzumbe | ANC |
| 47 | uMhlabuyalingana | ANC |
| 48 | Ndwedwe | ANC |
| 49 | Maphumulo | ANC |
| 50 | Vulamehlo | ANC |

| National rank | Municipality | Province | Governing party |
|---------------|----------------------|----------|-----------------|
| 124 | Lepelle-Nkumpi | LP | ANC |
| 125 | Nkonkobe | EC | ANC |
| 126 | Makhado | LP | ANC |
| 127 | Chief Albert Luthuli | MP | ANC |
| 128 | Mier | NC | ANC |
| 129 | Lekwa-Teemane | NW | ANC |
| 130 | Maluti-A-Phofung | FS | ANC |
| 131 | AbaQulusi | KZN | ANC |
| 132 | Richmond | KZN | ANC |
| 133 | Emalahleni | MP | ANC |
| 134 | Tsolwana | EC | ANC |
| 135 | Ulundi | KZN | IFP |
| 136 | Dannhauser | KZN | ANC |
| 137 | Magareng | NC | ANC |
| 138 | Amahlathi | EC | ANC |
| 139 | Musina | LP | ANC |
| 140 | Senqu | EC | ANC |
| 141 | Thabazimbi | LP | ANC |
| 142 | Dr JS Moroka | MP | ANC |
| 143 | Ga-Segonyana | NC | ANC |
| 144 | Mahikeng | NW | ANC |
| 145 | Joe Morolong | NC | ANC |
| 146 | uMtshezi | KZN | ANC |
| 147 | Ramotshere Moiloa | NW | ANC |
| 148 | Siyancuma | NC | ANC |
| 149 | Mthonjaneni | KZN | ANC-NFP |
| 150 | Dikgatlong | NC | ANC |
| 151 | Thembisile Hani | MP | ANC |
| 152 | Ba-Phalaborwa | LP | ANC |
| 153 | Westonaria | GP | ANC |
| 154 | Sundays River Valley | EC | ANC |
| 155 | Moretele | NW | ANC |
| 156 | Mutale | LP | ANC |
| 157 | Blouberg | LP | ANC |
| 158 | uMshwathi | KZN | ANC |
| 159 | Ingwe | KZN | ANC |
| 160 | Phokwane | NC | ANC |
| 161 | Greater Tzaneen | LP | ANC |
| 162 | Rustenburg | NW | ANC |
| 163 | Impendle | KZN | ANC |
| 164 | Greater Letaba | LP | ANC |
| 165 | Ezinqoleni | KZN | ANC |

| Provincial rank | Municipality | Governing party |
|-----------------|----------------------|-----------------|
| 51 | Ntambanana | ANC |
| Limpopo | | |
| 1 | Modimolle | ANC |
| 2 | Bela-Bela | ANC |
| 3 | Lephalale | ANC |
| 4 | Mookgophong | ANC |
| 5 | Mogalakwena | ANC |
| 6 | Polokwane | ANC |
| 7 | Lepelle-Nkumpi | ANC |
| 8 | Makhado | ANC |
| 9 | Musina | ANC |
| 10 | Thabazimbi | ANC |
| 11 | Ba-Phalaborwa | ANC |
| 12 | Mutale | ANC |
| 13 | Blouberg | ANC |
| 14 | Greater Tzaneen | ANC |
| 15 | Greater Letaba | ANC |
| 16 | Fetakgomo | ANC |
| 17 | Elias Motsoaledi | ANC |
| 18 | Maruleng | ANC |
| 19 | Molemole | ANC |
| 20 | Aganang | ANC |
| 21 | Thulamela | ANC |
| 22 | Ephraim Mogale | ANC |
| 23 | Greater Giyani | ANC |
| 24 | Makhuduthamaga | ANC |
| 25 | Greater Tubatse | ANC |
| Mpumalanga | | |
| 1 | Govan Mbeki | ANC |
| 2 | Lekwa | ANC |
| 3 | Steve Tshwete | ANC |
| 4 | Thaba Chweu | ANC |
| 5 | Emakhazeni | ANC |
| 6 | Pixley ka Isaka Seme | ANC |
| 7 | Umjindi | ANC |
| 8 | Victor Khanye | ANC |
| 9 | Dipaleseng | ANC |
| 10 | Msukaligwa | ANC |
| 11 | Mbombela | ANC |
| 12 | Chief Albert Luthuli | ANC |
| 13 | Emalahleni | ANC |
| 14 | Dr JS Moroka | ANC |

| National rank | Municipality | Province | Governing party |
|---------------|--------------------|----------|-----------------|
| 166 | eDumbe | KZN | NFP |
| 167 | eMadlangeni | KZN | ANC |
| 168 | Fetakgomo | LP | ANC |
| 169 | Big Five False Bay | KZN | IFP |
| 170 | Mkhambathini | KZN | ANC |
| 171 | Nkandla | KZN | IFP |
| 172 | Elias Motsoaledi | LP | ANC |
| 173 | Ventersdorp | NW | ANC* |
| 174 | Madibeng | NW | ANC* |
| 175 | uPhongolo | KZN | ANC |
| 176 | Ratlou | NW | ANC |
| 177 | Okhahlamba | KZN | ANC |
| 178 | Maquassi Hills | NW | ANC |
| 179 | Maruleng | LP | ANC |
| 180 | Mamusa | NW | ANC |
| 181 | Molemole | LP | ANC |
| 182 | uMfolozi | KZN | ANC |
| 183 | Umvoti | KZN | ANC |
| 184 | Sakhisizwe | EC | ANC |
| 185 | Kgetlengrivier | NW | ANC |
| 186 | uMuziwabantu | KZN | ANC |
| 187 | Elundini | EC | ANC |
| 188 | Ditsobotla | NW | ANC |
| 189 | Aganang | LP | ANC |
| 190 | Bushbuckridge | MP | ANC |
| 191 | Ngqushwa | EC | ANC |
| 192 | Nquthu | KZN | ANC-NFP |
| 193 | Tswaing | NW | ANC* |
| 194 | Emalahleni | EC | ANC |
| 195 | !Kheis | NC | ANC |
| 196 | uMzimkhulu | KZN | ANC |
| 197 | Mtubatuba | KZN | ANC |
| 198 | uMlalazi | KZN | ANC |
| 199 | Mkhondo | MP | ANC |
| 200 | Great Kei | EC | ANC |
| 201 | Indaka | KZN | ANC-NFP* |
| 202 | Thulamela | LP | ANC |
| 203 | Kagisano-Molopo | NW | ANC |
| 204 | Matatiele | EC | ANC |
| 205 | Nongoma | KZN | NFP |
| 206 | Ephraim Mogale | LP | ANC |
| 207 | Ubuhlebezwe | KZN | ANC |

| Provincial rank | Municipality | Governing party |
|---------------------|-------------------|-----------------|
| 15 | Thembisile Hani | ANC |
| 16 | Bushbuckridge | ANC |
| 17 | Mkhondo | ANC |
| 18 | Nkomazi | ANC |
| Northern Cape | | |
| 1 | Emthanjeni | ANC |
| 2 | Hantam | DA-COPE |
| 3 | Richtersveld | ANC |
| 4 | //Khara Hais | ANC |
| 5 | Umsobomvu | ANC |
| 6 | Khâi-Ma | ANC |
| 7 | Nama Khoi | ANC |
| 8 | Gamagara | ANC |
| 9 | Kgatelopele | ANC |
| 10 | Siyathemba | ANC |
| 11 | Karoo Hoogland | DA-COPE |
| 12 | Sol Plaatje | ANC |
| 13 | Kamiesberg | ANC |
| 14 | Kareeberg | ANC |
| 15 | Thembelihle | ANC |
| 16 | Renosterberg | ANC |
| 17 | Kai !Garib | ANC |
| 18 | Ubuntu | ANC |
| 19 | Tsantsabane | ANC |
| 20 | Mier | ANC |
| 21 | Magareng | ANC |
| 22 | Ga-Segonyana | ANC |
| 23 | Joe Morolong | ANC |
| 24 | Siyancuma | ANC |
| 25 | Dikgatlong | ANC |
| 26 | Phokwane | ANC |
| 27 | !Kheis | ANC |
| North West Province | | |
| 1 | City of Matlosana | ANC* |
| 2 | Moses Kotane | ANC |
| 3 | Naledi | ANC |
| 4 | Tlokwe | ANC |
| 5 | Lekwa-Teemane | ANC |
| 6 | Mahikeng | ANC |
| 7 | Ramotshere Moiloa | ANC |
| 8 | Moretele | ANC |
| 9 | Rustenburg | ANC |

| National rank | Municipality | Province | Governing party |
|---------------|------------------------|----------|-----------------|
| 208 | Hlabisa | KZN | IFP |
| 209 | Greater Giyani | LP | ANC |
| 210 | Jozini | KZN | ANC |
| 211 | Nkomazi | MP | ANC |
| 212 | Imbabazane | KZN | ANC* |
| 213 | Makhuduthamaga | LP | ANC |
| 214 | Msinga | KZN | IFP |
| 215 | King Sabata Dalindyebo | EC | ANC |
| 216 | Greater Taung | NW | ANC |
| 217 | Umzimvubu | EC | ANC |
| 218 | Mnquma | EC | ANC |
| 219 | Umzumbe | KZN | ANC |
| 220 | uMhlabuyalingana | KZN | ANC |
| 221 | Nyandeni | EC | ANC |
| 222 | Ndwedwe | KZN | ANC |
| 223 | Port St Johns | EC | ANC |
| 224 | Intsika Yethu | EC | ANC |
| 225 | Mhlontlo | EC | ANC |
| 226 | Engcobo | EC | ANC |
| 227 | Maphumulo | KZN | ANC |
| 228 | Mbhashe | EC | ANC |
| 229 | Greater Tubatse | LP | ANC |
| 230 | Vulamehlo | KZN | ANC |
| 231 | Ingquza Hill | EC | ANC |
| 232 | Ntambanana | KZN | ANC |
| 233 | Ntabankulu | EC | ANC |
| 234 | Mbizana | EC | ANC |

| Provincial rank | Municipality | Governing party |
|---------------------|-------------------|-----------------|
| 10 | Ventersdorp | ANC* |
| 11 | Madibeng | ANC* |
| 12 | Ratlou | ANC |
| 13 | Maquassi Hills | ANC |
| 14 | Mamusa | ANC |
| 15 | Kgetlengrivier | ANC |
| 16 | Ditsobotla | ANC* |
| 17 | Tswaing | ANC* |
| 18 | Kagisano-Molopo | ANC |
| 19 | Greater Taung | ANC |
| Western Cape | | |
| 1 | Swellendam | DA-ACDP |
| 2 | Hessequa | DA |
| 3 | Bergrivier | DA |
| 4 | Swartland | DA |
| 5 | Mossel Bay | DA |
| 6 | Langeberg | DA |
| 7 | Overstrand | DA |
| 8 | Saldanha | DA |
| 9 | Witzenberg | DA-COPE-DCP-IND |
| 10 | Cape Agulhas | ANC |
| 11 | Beaufort West | ANC |
| 12 | Prince Albert | ANC |
| 13 | Matzikama | ANC |
| 14 | Drakenstein | DA |
| 15 | George | DA |
| 16 | City of Cape Town | DA |
| 17 | Cederberg | ANC |
| 18 | Stellenbosch | DA |
| 19 | Bitou | DA |
| 20 | Breede Valley | DA |
| 21 | Laingsburg | DA-COPE |
| 22 | Knysna | DA |
| 23 | Theewaterskloof | DA |
| 24 | Oudtshoorn | ANC* |
| 25 | Kannaland | ICOSA-ANC |

Political parties: abbreviations

| | |
|-------|--|
| ACDP | African Christian Democratic Party |
| ANC | African National Congress |
| COPE | Congress of the People |
| DA | Democratic Alliance |
| DCP | Democratic Christian Party |
| ICOSA | Independent Civic Organisation of South Africa |
| IFP | Inkatha Freedom Party |
| IND | Independent |
| KGP | Karoo Gemeenskap Party |
| NFP | National Freedom Party |

* Indicates the municipality is currently under provincial administration

South Africa local government: where do we stand?

GGA Government Performance Index 2016: analysis and interpretation

The good, the bad and the indifferent

Data and methodology

GGA's Government Performance Index (GPI) ranks South Africa's 234 municipalities and covers both local and metropolitan municipalities. District municipalities were excluded on account of limited information and because they are made up of local municipalities. In determining the rankings, GGA gathered data on 15 indicators across three clusters: administration, economic development and service delivery.

Data for the GPI was sourced from Statistics South Africa, the Gaffney Local Government Yearbook (2013-2015), the Auditor General's Reports, the Extended Public Works Programme and the National Treasury. Though the indicators are weighted equally, there are eight service delivery indicators, conveying the service delivery performance of municipalities with the greatest impact on their overall rank.

In addition to these eight, there are four economic development indicators

and three administration indicators. Table 1 lists the indicators and briefly defines them.

Observations

GGA's national ranking of South Africa's municipalities shows that the top three performing municipalities are Swellendam, Hessequa and Bergrivier—all in the Western Cape. In fact, of the top 20 municipalities, 15 are in the Western Cape. Of these, four are run by the ANC, eight by the DA, and a further three by coalitions which all include the DA. The top performer, Swellendam is led by a DA-African Christian Democratic Party coalition and municipalities ranked second to eighth are all DA-led.

The Northern Cape Province has three municipalities in the top 20; these are Emthanjeni and Richtersveld, both held by the ANC, and Hantam, which is run by a DA-COPE coalition. The only other province with municipalities in the top 20 is the Free State, represented by Metsimaholo and Dihlabeng, both held by the ANC.

The top three municipalities performed particularly well with regard to the economic development indicators of unemployment and poverty, with all three municipalities in the top 10 of each of these individual indicators' rankings. The three top municipalities ranked quite well on the service delivery indicator, electricity, with all three featuring in the top 20 in each of the individual indicators' rankings. Interestingly the top three municipalities did not do well on the education indicator: Hessequa stands at 96, while Bergrivier and Swellendam

Table 1: Ranking indicators and descriptions

| Indicator | | Description |
|------------------------------|------------------------------------|---|
| Administration: | | |
| 1 | Municipal capacity | Drawn from the auditor general's assessment of auditees' key controls at the time of the audit and particularly focuses on the human resources management performance of the local authority |
| 2 | Financial soundness | Drawn from the auditor general's opinion on the financial position of the local authority |
| 3 | Compliance | Measures how well the annual reporting by a local authority meets the standards set by the National Treasury |
| Economic development: | | |
| 4 | Poverty | Indicates the percentage of households with an income below R2,300 per month |
| 5 | Individual income | Shows the percentage of the population that receives some form of monthly income, including social grants |
| 6 | Work opportunities | Paid work created for an individual on an Extended Public Works Programme project for any period of time, within the employment conditions of code of good practice for special public works programme (1 April 2014 - 31 Mar 2015) |
| 7 | Unemployment rate | A person is unemployed only if they have "taken active steps to look for work or to start some form of self-employment in the four weeks prior to the interview" |
| Service delivery: | | |
| 8 | Water | The percentage of households in the municipality that do not have access to piped water |
| 9 | Sanitation | The percentage of households in the municipality that have no form of sanitation |
| 10 | Education | The percentage of the population in the municipality that has a matric qualification |
| 11 | Electricity | The percentage of households in the municipality that have access to electricity |
| 12 | Informal housing to formal housing | The percentage of informal houses to total dwellings in the municipality |
| 13 | Refuse removal | The percentage of households in the municipality that have their refuse collected on a weekly basis |
| 14 | Health facilities | The total number of people per clinic and healthcare facilities in the municipality |
| 15 | Police coverage | The number of people per police station in the municipality |

are at positions 112 and 143 respectively.

South Africa's worst-performing municipality is Mbizana in the Eastern Cape, followed by Ntabankulu, which is in the same province, and Ntambanana in KwaZulu-Natal (KZN). In fact, the


Eastern Cape accounts for 12 out of the 20 worst performing municipalities in the country. A further six of the bottom 20 municipalities are in KZN. Greater Tubatse municipality in Limpopo and Greater Taung in the North West


Province complete the bottom 20 list—all 20 are led by the ANC.

The top 20 municipalities performed particularly well as regards two administration indicators, municipal capacity and financial soundness—frequently getting top ratings. There was no discernible pattern with regard to the third, the reporting compliance indicator, with some of the lowly ranked municipalities—among them Big Five False Bay in KZN and Mbashe in Eastern Cape—scoring top ratings for this indicator, while still remaining in the bottom 20 on the overall rankings.

Contrasting the top 20 and the bottom 20 municipalities helps to infer which of the indicators make the largest contribution to performance gaps. Figure 1 summarises eight of the 10 continuous indicators that were used in the rankings, excluding health and policing, which could not be expressed as percentages. The indicators are education, electricity, weekly refuse removal, poverty rates, individual monthly income, water and sanitation.

With regard to electricity, on average 80.3% of households have electricity nationally. This ratio increases to





91.8% for the top 20 but drops quite significantly to 55% for the bottom 20 municipalities. The provision of weekly refuse removal emerged as another important distinguishing indicator, dropping from an average of 79.8% in the top 20 municipalities to only 5.5% of households with this service in the bottom 20 municipalities.

Similarly, the share of households without access to piped water averaged 1.2% for the top 20 municipalities but jumped to 43.1% when the bottom 20 were reviewed. In Mbizana for instance, the lowest ranked municipality, 84.9% of residents have no access to piped water, a marked contrast to Swellendam (the top municipality) where only 1.5%


of residents lack this service.

In the best performing municipality, Swellendam, 88.3% of all dwellings consist of formal houses, a massive contrast to the Mbizana, where only 1.1% of dwellings are considered formal. Another service delivery indicator that substantially weighed down bottom-ranking municipalities was sanitation. On average, residents in the bottom 20 municipalities are 5.3 times more likely to have no access to sanitation facilities than residents in the top 20.

The average proportion of people who have obtained a grade 12, or Matric pass in the top 20 municipalities is only slightly higher than the national municipal average (23.8% versus 22.5%), but significantly higher than the 16% average across the bottom 20 municipalities.

Moving on to the indicators on economic opportunity, the proportion of individuals with a monthly income is rather stable across all municipalities. This seeming stability of income in the midst of high unemployment rates

Figure 1: Municipal averages across the top and bottom 20



can perhaps be attributed to the social grants, which are included in the individual monthly income indicator. Unemployment rates, on the other hand, show a sharp contrast (18.2% in the top 20 versus 47.6% in the bottom 20).


Similarly, poverty levels are much lower in the top 20 performing municipalities. On average, 48.5% of households earn less than R2,300 per month, compared to 76.1% of households in the bottom 20.

Municipalities' administrative capacity was also evaluated. In total, 54 of the 234 municipalities had the highest rating for this indicator, 25 of these in KZN and 17 in the Western Cape. By contrast, 23 of the 39 municipalities in the Eastern Cape achieved the worst possible score. With regard to compliance in annual reporting standards, 41 municipalities were deemed compliant, 11 of them in the Western Cape and 8 in the Eastern Cape. KZN had the largest number of municipalities (18) that did not comply with reporting standards, followed by Limpopo (15), North West and the Northern Cape with 13 municipalities each.

Turning to where the political parties fare best, all of the top-scoring DA-led municipalities are in the Western

Distribution of performance indicators

Percentage of households with no form of sanitation



Dots above and below the box plot indicate municipalities with outlying scores © GGA

Cape. This is not surprising, since 15 of the party's 17 municipalities are in that province, the only two exceptions being Baviaans in the Eastern Cape and Midvaal in Gauteng. The party's top five performing municipalities are Hessequa, followed by Bergrivier, Swartland, Mossel Bay and Langeberg. These perform well in poverty rates, electricity and all the administration indicators: financial soundness, compliance and municipal capacity.

Midvaal in Gauteng is the lowest-ranking DA municipality, though it occupies the 67th position nationally. Its performance was negatively impacted by the population not receiving an income (206th) and by health facilities (201th). The party's second-worst performing municipality is Theewaterskloof followed by Knysna,



*Households with an income below R2,300 per month

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
both pulled down by the health and police coverage indicators. The DA municipalities generally performed well across all three performance clusters.

As regards service delivery, the


electricity.

In the discussion that follows, we will make repeated references to Table 2 to give an overview of further observations from the rankings. By

Distribution of performance indicators



Dots below the box plot indicate municipalities with outlying scores



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DA's highlights include refuse removal, water, sanitation and provision of electricity. In administration, its highlights are municipal capacity and financial soundness. In economic development, the DA did well as regards the poverty and unemployment indicators.

Table 2 summarises all 15 indicators. It reports the national averages and averages for each indicator by political party and by province. In seven of these indicators the Western Cape has superior averages which relate to the DA averages in the same table. The ANC's average for the health facilities indicator is the only one that outperformed the DA's. Other political parties and coalitions in KZN, Northern Cape and Western Cape—which are in charge of a total of 16 municipalities—have relatively weak averages for the service delivery indicators, especially refuse removal, sanitation, water and

default, we have already discussed the Western Cape because it has most of the top municipalities. Moving away from the Western Cape, most municipalities are ANC-led such that the discussion from this stage implicitly reports on the ANC-led municipalities.

We mentioned earlier that most of the worst performing municipalities are in the Eastern Cape. The province is significantly weighed down by high poverty rates, unemployment and poor scores on the education indicator. With regard to the poverty indicator for instance, the worst performing eight municipalities nationally on poverty rates are in the Eastern Cape. With regard to education Kouga, the best ranked provincial municipality on that indicator, lies in position 88 nationally, clearly showing the poor performance of the province on education.

It is also important to report that even though Eastern


Table 2: Average municipal indicators by party and province

| Variable | Political parties | | | | | Provinces | | | | | | | National average |
|---------------------|-------------------|-------|--------|-------|-------|-----------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|------------------|
| | ANC | DA | Other* | EC | FS | GP | KZN | LP | MP | NC | NW | WC | |
| Municipal capacity | 2.29 | 1.12 | 1.94 | 2.49 | 2.55 | 2 | 1.67 | 2.4 | 2.28 | 2.52 | 2.74 | 1.44 | 2.18 |
| Financial soundness | 3.01 | 1.24 | 2.63 | 3.21 | 3.55 | 2.2 | 2 | 3.16 | 3.22 | 3.81 | 3.58 | 1.6 | 2.85 |
| Compliance | 3.05 | 2.24 | 2.63 | 2.79 | 2.75 | 2.2 | 3.16 | 3.44 | 3.11 | 3.07 | 3.42 | 2.28 | 2.97 |
| Poverty | 65.36 | 48.93 | 63.74 | 71.24 | 65.64 | 50.98 | 68.97 | 69.82 | 61.07 | 57.49 | 66.13 | 48.67 | 64.05 |
| Monthly income | 52.82 | 50.12 | 55.08 | 53.8 | 56.03 | 48.64 | 51.97 | 52.4 | 51.18 | 54.83 | 52.27 | 51.58 | 52.78 |
| Work opportunities | 4.42 | 4.71 | 4.81 | 4.44 | 4.6 | 3.3 | 4.61 | 4.24 | 4.06 | 4.96 | 4.21 | 4.8 | 4.47 |
| Unemployment | 33.65 | 19.08 | 32.48 | 37.24 | 31.79 | 26.58 | 37.85 | 38.78 | 31.69 | 26.79 | 32.65 | 17.55 | 32.51 |
| Water | 12.47 | 1.38 | 21.64 | 20.34 | 2.23 | 1.84 | 24.88 | 12.93 | 10.11 | 2.84 | 7.19 | 1.27 | 12.29 |
| Sanitation | 8.14 | 3.42 | 11.25 | 13.77 | 3.95 | 2.61 | 9.54 | 6.71 | 5.59 | 8.54 | 7.83 | 3.95 | 8.01 |
| Education | 22.33 | 26.03 | 21.36 | 16.06 | 23.19 | 31.42 | 24.83 | 21.58 | 28.07 | 20.36 | 21.68 | 23.83 | 22.53 |
| Electricity | 80.47 | 92.03 | 65.37 | 76.09 | 89.01 | 84.05 | 66.09 | 87.3 | 84.89 | 83.66 | 82.5 | 91.62 | 80.28 |
| Housing | 1.92 | 1.82 | 1.25 | 2.05 | 1.15 | 2.9 | 2.02 | 1.56 | 2.17 | 1.44 | 2.47 | 1.56 | 1.87 |
| Refuse | 45.8 | 83.72 | 33.11 | 39.72 | 68.77 | 82.23 | 24.65 | 25.94 | 51.83 | 66.94 | 41.57 | 79.03 | 47.68 |
| Health facilities | 2.16 | 2.18 | 1.94 | 1.69 | 1.5 | 3.7 | 2.78 | 2.4 | 2.44 | 1.52 | 2.05 | 1.76 | 2.15 |
| Police coverage | 3.7 | 3.47 | 3.69 | 3.54 | 3 | 4.8 | 4.22 | 4.32 | 4 | 2.3 | 3.95 | 3.32 | 3.68 |


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*Includes IFP, NFP, and coalitions which include COPE, ACDP, ICOSA and INDEPENDENTS

Distribution of performance indicators



Dots above and below the box plot indicate municipalities with outlying scores



© GGA

Cape municipalities generally underperformed, we noticed strengths in some of the municipalities. This is indeed the case with Elundini, Senqu and Nyandeni which all had the top scores in the administration indicators of municipal capacity and compliance.

We also observed that areas of strength for a number of the municipalities in KZN were similar to those in Eastern Cape. As reported earlier, 25 of the 51 municipalities in the province had top scores in municipal capacity and nine had top scores on financial soundness.

It would seem that the ANC-led municipalities tend to perform well in administration indicators but underperform on both the service delivery indicators and on economic

development indicators. On electricity for instance, eight of the KZN municipalities are among the worst performing 10 municipalities in the country.

While the underperformance of the ANC-led municipalities on service delivery and economic development indicators may seem to be the plausibly emerging pattern, we noted some exceptions. One such exception is on education, where the results show a rather strong performance in Mpumalanga. This is demonstrated by two of its municipalities, Mbombela and Steve Tshwete, which both feature in the top 10 national municipalities for that indicator. Steve Tshwete also scored well on poverty rates and is ranked tenth nationally. The municipality also



© GGA

had the top score in financial soundness.

Limpopo and the Free State municipalities performed well on the housing indicator. Of the 25 municipalities in Limpopo, 16 had the top scores on the housing indicator while only three of the 20 municipalities in the Free State did not get the top score. In the North West, the City of Matlosana is the top municipality with its best scores being sanitation and refuse removal.


Another North West municipality

more than the economic development indicators.

The Gauteng municipalities, where all but one (Midvaal) are ANC-led, performed well on education and sanitation. Westonaria, the worst performer in Gauteng is significantly weighed down by electricity, individual income and all the administration indicators. As a whole, the province has the worst average on police coverage and health facilities per person.

There have been previous efforts

Figure 2: Demographics of the top and bottom 20 municipalities



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that performed well on sanitation is Tlokwe. Tlokwe was in fact ranked ninth nationally on the sanitation indicator. However, North West has the worst average score on financial soundness.

It was quite difficult to discern a pattern in the performance of municipalities in Northern Cape, except perhaps to reiterate that the province had three spots in the top 20 national rankings. What perhaps weighed down other municipalities were service delivery and administration indicators

to evaluate the performance of all municipalities in South Africa. The 80/20 Report on Local Government compiled by the Institute of Race Relations (IRR) selected 10 of its original 80 indicators to give each of the country's municipalities a "service delivery" score out of 10. We noted, however, that their score also included poverty and unemployment. We then ranked their scores and compared them with ours.

Interestingly, Swellendam obtained

their top rank, as it did on our overall rankings (although it only ranked 13th on our service delivery scorecard). Whereas the IRR score has two indicators each for sanitation and water, ours had one indicator each for sanitation and water, but also included health and policing indicators. When we included poverty and unemployment indicators, which in our ranking fall under economic development, Swellendam also tops the list. This confirms the benefit of teasing out performance-related analysis.

In addition to the above, it is important to note that other important factors must be considered when assessing municipalities' performance. One of these is the demographic spread between and within municipalities.


Figure 2 suggests that the higher the population density the higher the likelihood that a municipality will be ranked poorly with regard to these indicators. There are on average 29.2 people per square kilometre in the top 20 municipalities while there are 88.9 people on average in the bottom 20.

Municipalities with higher age dependency ratios are more likely to perform poorly. The age dependency ratio is the number of people aged below 15 years and those above 64 for every 100 people in the working-age population. Figure 2 shows that municipalities in the top 20 have an average dependency ratio of 50, much lower than the average of 83 for the bottom 20 municipalities.

In other words, better-performing municipalities tend to have larger working-age populations relative to their populations above and below working age. In addition, low-ranking municipalities are more likely to have a larger population under the age of 14 and a larger household size than their better-scoring peers.

Trends in population growth are also telling. On average, the bottom 20 municipalities experience a population decrease (as can be seen by an average negative growth rate of -0.2%), possibly as a result of people searching for better living conditions elsewhere.

As a final caveat, we cannot ignore





the historicity involved in the current state of affairs. It appears to be no coincidence that the lowest ranked municipalities in our rankings are also located primarily in a former bantustan or homeland, namely the Transkei and specifically in the area known as Pondoland, which became a British protectorate and which was annexed to the Cape Colony in 1894 (see GGA map on p.109).



Former homeland governments were infamous both for their intentional under-development and endemic corruption. In terms of liberation history, however, it remains somewhat ironic that Mbizana, the lowest ranking municipality, is the birthplace of both Oliver Tambo and Winnie Madikizela-Mandela.


Taken as a whole, our GGA rankings communicate the urgency with which resources need be invested in service delivery in the lower ranked municipalities as is confirmed by our nationally representative governance survey report. Perhaps equally important would be to ensure that social and economic development are fast-tracked, particularly in impoverished and under-developed areas.

Finally, municipal administrators should be constantly assessed and benchmarked against their peers—an initiative that would promote improved accountability and governance.

To reflect the current situation clearly, GGA has created three accessible heat maps. 







SA local government: ward councillors survey

Citizens share their perceptions of local government representations with Markdata


‘We will see them when it is election time’

Markdata conducted a nationwide Omnibus study amongst 2,300 respondents in 2015. Personal, face-to-face interviews were conducted in both urban and rural areas. Fieldwork took place during August 2015 using a structured questionnaire.

In the light of the upcoming local elections in May of this year, Markdata included four questions in the study on the topic of local ward councillors and how they are perceived by voters. They were asked whether they had access to, or knew how to get access to their councillors if needed and whether they knew if these councillors had done anything in the past year to improve conditions in their municipal wards.

They were then asked to rate the statement “How well does the councillor look after your interests in the ward” on a scale of 1 to 10 (where 1 was “Does not look after my interests at all” and 10 was “Looks after my interests very well”) and provide their reasons for the rating in an open-ended question. The responses were coded and categorised.


Two thirds (66%) indicated that they do not have access to their councillors. Only around one third (34%) indicated that they do have access.



When asked whether they knew if their councillor had done anything in the past year to improve conditions in their ward, a resounding 72% said no and only 28% said yes.

For the rating of the councillors the overall Living Standards Measurement Index (LSM) mean score was 3.4, which is very low indeed. This was cross tabulated by LSM.

The lower the LSM the less satisfied respondents were with their councillors, as can be seen from the graph below. For the lowest LSM (LSM 1) the mean score was 0.3 out of 10 and for the highest (LSM 10) the score was 3.9 out of 10.



The responses to the final open-ended question illustrated that negative categories mainly translate into a lack of contact with, and low or non-existent service delivery and performance by councillors. These categories (a total of 73%) are shown in the graph hereafter.


On the other hand the positive ratings, even though they were in the minority (27%) are a mirror image of the above. Respondents could see progress in the areas they were living in, such as better or more housing and improved service delivery in terms of roads and water and sanitation (16%). The remaining 11% felt that councillors “did a good job, tries his/her best” and they noted having regular meetings with them.

So what makes a good councillor? Someone who is in touch with the needs of the constituents and produces tangible results in the ward.

To conclude, the results do not indicate that local councillors do not

'We will see them when it is election time'

perform their functions, rather, that what they do is not visible or that they are not known to the constituents. A little goes a long way in this regard! And ironically, those in lower LSMs are still not seeing any progress through the actions of their councillors. There is a perception that voters are only acknowledged when their vote is needed, as mentioned by one respondent: “We will see them when it is election time.”



World Human Development Index

| Country | Rank | Country | Rank | Country | Rank | Country | Rank |
|----------------------|------|------------------------|------|----------------------------------|------|--------------------------|------|
| Norway | 1 | Kuwait | 48 | Libya | 94 | Bangladesh | 142 |
| Australia | 2 | Montenegro | 49 | Tunisia | 96 | Cambodia | 143 |
| Switzerland | 3 | Belarus | 50 | Colombia | 97 | Sao Tome and Principe | 143 |
| Denmark | 4 | Russian Federation | 50 | Saint Vincent and the Grenadines | 97 | Kenya | 145 |
| Netherlands | 5 | Oman | 52 | Jamaica | 99 | Nepal | 145 |
| Germany | 6 | Romania | 52 | Tonga | 100 | Pakistan | 147 |
| Ireland | 6 | Uruguay | 52 | Belize | 101 | Myanmar | 148 |
| United States | 8 | Bahamas | 55 | Dominican Republic | 101 | Angola | 149 |
| Canada | 9 | Kazakhstan | 56 | Suriname | 103 | Swaziland | 150 |
| New Zealand | 9 | Barbados | 57 | Maldives | 104 | Tanzania | 151 |
| Singapore | 11 | Antigua and Barbuda | 58 | Samoa | 105 | Nigeria | 152 |
| Hong Kong, China | 12 | Bulgaria | 59 | Botswana | 106 | Cameroon | 153 |
| Liechtenstein | 13 | Palau | 60 | Moldova | 107 | Madagascar | 154 |
| Sweden | 14 | Panama | 60 | Egypt | 108 | Zimbabwe | 155 |
| United Kingdom | 14 | Malaysia | 62 | Turkmenistan | 109 | Mauritania | 156 |
| Iceland | 16 | Mauritius | 63 | Gabon | 110 | Solomon Islands | 156 |
| Korea (Republic of) | 17 | Seychelles | 64 | Indonesia | 110 | Papua New Guinea | 158 |
| Israel | 18 | Trinidad and Tobago | 64 | Paraguay | 112 | Comoros | 159 |
| Luxembourg | 19 | Serbia | 66 | Palestine | 113 | Yemen | 160 |
| Japan | 20 | Cuba | 67 | Uzbekistan | 114 | Lesotho | 161 |
| Belgium | 21 | Lebanon | 67 | Philippines | 115 | Togo | 162 |
| France | 22 | Costa Rica | 69 | El Salvador | 116 | Haiti | 163 |
| Austria | 23 | Iran | 69 | South Africa | 116 | Rwanda | 163 |
| Finland | 24 | Venezuela | 71 | Viet Nam | 116 | Uganda | 163 |
| Slovenia | 25 | Turkey | 72 | Bolivia | 119 | Benin | 166 |
| Spain | 26 | Sri Lanka | 73 | Kyrgyzstan | 120 | Sudan | 167 |
| Italy | 27 | Mexico | 74 | Iraq | 121 | Djibouti | 168 |
| Czech Republic | 28 | Brazil | 75 | Cabo Verde | 122 | South Sudan | 169 |
| Greece | 29 | Georgia | 76 | Micronesia | 123 | Senegal | 170 |
| Estonia | 30 | St Kitts and Nevis | 77 | Guyana | 124 | Afghanistan | 171 |
| Brunei Darussalam | 31 | Azerbaijan | 78 | Nicaragua | 125 | Côte d'Ivoire | 172 |
| Cyprus | 32 | Grenada | 79 | Morocco | 126 | Malawi | 173 |
| Qatar | 32 | Jordan | 80 | Namibia | 126 | Ethiopia | 174 |
| Andorra | 34 | Macedonia | 81 | Guatemala | 128 | Gambia | 175 |
| Slovakia | 35 | Ukraine | 81 | Tajikistan | 129 | Congo (DRC) | 176 |
| Poland | 36 | Algeria | 83 | India | 130 | Liberia | 177 |
| Lithuania | 37 | Peru | 84 | Honduras | 131 | Guinea-Bissau | 178 |
| Malta | 37 | Albania | 85 | Bhutan | 132 | Mali | 179 |
| Saudi Arabia | 39 | Armenia | 85 | Timor-Leste | 133 | Mozambique | 180 |
| Argentina | 40 | Bosnia and Herzegovina | 85 | Syria | 134 | Sierra Leone | 181 |
| United Arab Emirates | 41 | Ecuador | 88 | Vanuatu | 134 | Guinea | 182 |
| Chile | 42 | Saint Lucia | 89 | Congo | 136 | Burkina Faso | 183 |
| Portugal | 43 | China | 90 | Kiribati | 137 | Burundi | 184 |
| Hungary | 44 | Fiji | 90 | Equatorial Guinea | 138 | Chad | 185 |
| Bahrain | 45 | Mongolia | 90 | Zambia | 139 | Eritrea | 186 |
| Latvia | 46 | Thailand | 93 | Ghana | 140 | Central African Republic | 187 |
| Croatia | 47 | Dominica | 94 | Laos | 141 | Niger | 188 |

Source: UN Development Programme (rankings as assigned by the UNDP)