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South Africans saw the pernicious influence of social media in spreading mis- and disinformation in the national elections of 2024, and in numerous elections around the world. Now it is almost time to head to the polls again, this time to elect those local government representatives with whom we, as the voting public, wish to entrust our needs and rights.
However, it cannot be business as usual any more, as Dr Maxwell Maseko of the Wits School of Governance’s Tayarisha Centre explains in this opinion piece. New safeguards must be put in place if the electorate is to safely cast their votes without undue influence or pressure.
We reproduce the piece below, in its entirety.
Safeguarding elections through a social media code of conduct
By Maxwell Maseko, PhD
First published on LinkedIn
South Africa’s Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) faces an uphill battle against misinformation and disinformation ahead of the 2026 local government elections. With over 500 political parties registered in the country, the scale and complexity of the challenge is difficult to overstate.
The IEC also anticipates the growth of generative artificial intelligence (AI) and disinformation.
Tackling these issues, therefore, remains politically and socially urgent to protect democratic stability. Left unaddressed, they risk not only tarnishing the IEC’s image but also confusing voters.
In its 2024 national election report, the commission highlighted cyberattacks and harassment, particularly on X, directed at both the institution and some of its staff. The report also pointed to orchestrated misinformation and disinformation campaigns designed to erode trust in the electoral process.
These are not abstract concerns. They are already shaping the information environment in which voters must make decisions.
Presently, South Africa uses a mix of existing electoral rules, emerging guidelines, and partnerships to deal with online harms. A dedicated and comprehensive social media code of conduct could, therefore, play a meaningful role in protecting electoral integrity. But only if it is constitutionally sound and developed with public trust in mind.
The problem
South Africa’s online information challenges stem from a well-documented combination of structural inequality, digital dynamics, and institutional factors. This makes the country particularly vulnerable during election periods.
Misinformation and disinformation spread rapidly in environments characterised by deep socio-economic divides and uneven media literacy. It also means many voters are unable to verify their news sources, track and counter false information, especially on encrypted and closed platforms such as WhatsApp.
Low levels of public trust in institutions, combined with intense political competition during elections, make voters more susceptible to conspiracy theories and disinformation.
Because of these challenges, it is especially important to design solutions that are both effective and constitutionally sound, rather than heavy-handed or exclusionary.
More importantly, such solutions must include participation from the public, political parties, and civil society organisations.
Not just a South African problem
In the digital age, this issue is not unique to South Africa’s elections. Major democracies, including the UK, the US, and Canada, have taken various steps to address illegal online content. They have also formed partnerships with civil society and social media platforms to flag and respond to misinformation trends.
However, despite the useful lessons from abroad, South Africa cannot simply import these models. It must adapt them to its own constitutional and social context.
Viability of a social media code of conduct
Recently, IEC chief electoral officer Sy Mamabolo reportedly hinted at the idea of a social media code of conduct to protect elections. However, he appropriately said the commission was ‘verifying its constitutionality’.
At its core, the question is not whether misinformation and disinformation should be addressed, but how to do so without undermining the very democratic freedoms elections are meant to uphold.
So, what does this mean?
A social media code of conduct to combat misinformation must align with constitutional provisions on freedom of expression, political rights, and the limitation of rights.
Firstly, the Constitution protects freedom of expression, including political speech. This is crucial during elections for informed voting. However, protections do not cover incitement, hate speech, or harmful propaganda, allowing for regulation. A social media code against misinformation could potentially suppress lawful political speech.
Secondly, the constitution also protects political rights, such as the ability to campaign for political causes. During elections, citizens and parties need to communicate freely. Any new social media regulations should prevent unintended restrictions on legitimate campaigning and public engagement in political discourse.
Thirdly, limitations on political rights in the constitution mean that rights like voting, party formation, and campaigning can be legally restricted in an already crowded political landscape. However, any measures aimed at prohibiting lawful speech should be handled carefully. It should not unintentionally disadvantage smaller or less resourced parties, as this could raise serious concerns about fairness and inclusivity.
The solutions
To its credit, the IEC has taken significant steps to combat misinformation and disinformation. These include hiring social media specialists and employing dedicated call centre agents trained to respond to and manage queries on social media. The IEC actively monitors platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, LinkedIn, and X for misleading or false information, particularly related to elections.
To further address these issues, the organisation has launched a public awareness campaign aimed at educating voters about the dangers of misinformation and disinformation.
Additionally, the IEC has collaborated with technology companies like Meta, Google, Microsoft, and TikTok to develop tools and strategies for detecting and addressing false information. Partnerships have also been formed with the nonprofit organisation Media Monitoring Africa (MMA) to tackle concerns related to misinformation.
In February 2024, the Principles and Guidelines for the Use of Digital and Social Media in Elections in Africa were launched in partnership between the IEC and the Association of African Election Authorities.
Despite these strides being made, a concern remains regarding X’s non-participation in the IEC’s Framework of Cooperation, even though the platform was invited to participate. A 2024 Media Monitoring Africa report found that pre-election disinformation was most prevalent on X. Resolving this matter remains urgent ahead of the municipal elections.
Conclusion
Misinformation and disinformation pose significant risks to democratic processes, especially during elections when access to accurate information is critical for voters. Addressing this issue is central to the IEC’s mandate, but it cannot do it alone.
A social media code of conduct could form part of that response, but it is not a silver bullet. Its success will depend on how it is designed, who is involved in shaping it, and whether it is trusted by the public it aims to serve.
Approached carefully, a social media code of conduct must have clear rules, independent oversight, and genuine public participation. This is critical for strengthening electoral integrity without compromising constitutional rights.
However, if handled poorly, such a code risks fuelling perceptions of censorship and further eroding trust in institutions.
The real task, then, is not simply to regulate online speech, but to do so in a way that reinforces, rather than weakens, South Africa’s democratic foundations.
Maxwell Maseko researches digitalisation and its influence on governance, political processes, citizen engagement, policymaking, democracy, and elections. His work is interdisciplinary and aims to promote meaningful citizen participation in democratic governance processes.
